What do Players Know? : Nash Equilibrium and Cournot's Anticipation of the Adaptive Interpretation

11-34 p.

• Informazioni

  Codice DOI: 10.19272/201706101001

  ISSN: 1724-2169

  Permalink: http://digital.casalini.it/10.19272/201706101001
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