2016 - Franco Angeli
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Leibniz on error : between Descartes and Spinoza : will, judgement and the concept of reality
713-725 p.
- Descartes' theory of error is based on the attribution of judgment to the faculty of (free) will and on the wider scope of the latter with respect to perception. Against this theory, Spinoza rejects every distinction between perception and will, emphasizing that every perception has by itself an assertive force, which can be prevented only by some opposing perception. The author tries to show how Leibniz, while willing to maintain the distinction between perception and will, nevertheless adopts and develops this Spinozian idea in his psychological study on the "series of thoughts". This idea is developed in the context of a phenomenistic view of reality, where Leibniz tries to make sense of the judgement of reality in pragmatistic terms - i.e. through the striving to act, connected to some of our perceptions - or in terms of the coherence of perceptions themselves. [Publisher's Text].
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Information
ISSN: 1972-5558
KEYWORDS
- Judgement, reality, phenomenalism, Leibniz, Spinoza
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In this issue
- I volti dell'errore nel pensiero moderno : da Bacone a Leibniz : introduzione
- Fact, fiction and error in Bacon and the Royal Society
- Significato, falsità ed errore in Thomas Hobbes
- Descartes on error and madness
- Croisement, permutation : sur un schéma récurrent d'explication de l'erreur dans les philosophies de l'âge classique
- Pascal et l'erreur
- L'analyse morale de l'erreur chez Pierre Nicole
- Sommes-nous tous des lycanthropes? : imagination, folie et vision en dieu dans De la recherche de la vérité de Malebranche
- Spinoza e la necessità dell'errare
- Leibniz on error : between Descartes and Spinoza : will, judgement and the concept of reality
- Before judging : Leibniz on the ultimate origin of error
- The consequences of error : Leibniz and toleration
- Indice dei nomi
- Indice dell'annata 2016
