2016 - Franco Angeli
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Pascal et l'erreur
633-659 p.
- Pascal's conception of error involved the vast undertaking of subverting the role of the principle of non-contradiction, which Philosophy has always regarded as the ultimate criterion for falsity and truth. The aim of his âÂApologetic' is to criticize dogmatism and skepticism, both subject to the same misunderstanding, namely that what is contradictory cannot be true. Pascal not only highlights the failures of reason - skeptics before him had done so perfectly well - but he also shows that the foundations on which the proper functioning of reason rests - accepted by skeptics as well as by dogmatists - are inadequate and unable to give access to reality. For reality is contradictory and what is contradictory is real. It is, hence, in name of a rational demand that we shall reject these doctrines and resort to a higher rationality. In this sense, skepticism is a disappointed dogmatism and dogmatism an insufficient rationalism. [Publisher's Text].
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Information
ISSN: 1972-5558
KEYWORDS
- Error, contradiction, skepticism, dialectic, Apologetic
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In this issue
- I volti dell'errore nel pensiero moderno : da Bacone a Leibniz : introduzione
- Fact, fiction and error in Bacon and the Royal Society
- Significato, falsità ed errore in Thomas Hobbes
- Descartes on error and madness
- Croisement, permutation : sur un schéma récurrent d'explication de l'erreur dans les philosophies de l'âge classique
- Pascal et l'erreur
- L'analyse morale de l'erreur chez Pierre Nicole
- Sommes-nous tous des lycanthropes? : imagination, folie et vision en dieu dans De la recherche de la vérité de Malebranche
- Spinoza e la necessità dell'errare
- Leibniz on error : between Descartes and Spinoza : will, judgement and the concept of reality
- Before judging : Leibniz on the ultimate origin of error
- The consequences of error : Leibniz and toleration
- Indice dei nomi
- Indice dell'annata 2016
