The Origin of Causal Inference in Perception : A Transcendental Theory of Perception and Critique of Neo-Empiricism

sensory associations. The necessity of the distinction follows initially from arguments for visual computation and inference over and above inductive associationism, as well as empirical evidence across the cognitive sciences. The book culminates in arguing that a transcendental, as opposed to empiricist, approach to perception is also required by the phenomenology of cognition and perception. The cognitive psychology of Jerry Fodor and methodological apparatus of Edmund Husserl are combined to show that Kant's transcendental argument for cognition of causality against Humean associationism must finally be assimilated by cognitive science; and the epistemological foundation for this assimilation can be found in transcendental phenomenology, which is shown to support a computational theory of mind within perception. [Publisher's text]

557878 characters.